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THE CLIENT RETENTION AGREEMENT
-- THE ENGAGEMENT LETTER
by
WILLIAM C. BECKER*
INTRODUCTION
What I propose to do in this paper is to review various aspects of engagement
or client retention agreements. As background, I have examined some of the forms'
which are suggested for these agreements and a number of agreements currently in
use by lawyers and law firms, principally in the Summit County Ohio area.2 The
purpose of this effort is to examine some key provisions of these agreements and,
perhaps, suggest possible improvements.
I make no claim that the sampling of agreements which I have reviewed is
either scientific or sufficient for a complete study. I do believe, however, that the
variety which I have seen represents enough of a sample in sufficient variety to
support the observations herein.
The subject of retention letters is not specifically covered in the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Model Rules. 3 Neither requires such agreements.
Indeed, the responses which'I received indicate that many lawyers did not make a
practice of having written retention agreements prior to the time that written
contingency agreements became required in Ohio in certain cases,4 and still do not
use them where not statutorily mandated. I assume, of course, that even lawyers who
do not use written agreements must discuss the matter of fees and objectives with the
client at an early time and, presumably, reach some verbal agreement with them.
Nevertheless, I, at least, believe that retention agreements generally represent good
practice for a variety of reasons.
1. Retention agreements allow an explicit description and a continuing
Professor of Law, The University of Akron; A.B., Harvard Universiey (1951); J.D., University of Michigan
(1956).
3 AM. JutR. LEGAL FORMS 2d Attorneys at Law § 30:13-30:21 (1988).
2 Thirty plus agreements from lawyers or law firms principally located in Summit County Ohio, but also from
Cuyahoga, Trumbull, Franklin and Mahoning Counties, Ohio.
' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
4ORC § 4705.15
If an attorney and a client contract for the provision of legal services in connection with a
claim that is or may become the basis of a tort action and if the contract includes a contingent
fee agreement, that agreement shall be rcduced to writing and signed by the attorney and the
client. The attorney shall provide a copy of the signed writing to the client.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.15(B) (Baldwin 1988).
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record of the purpose for and the arrangements under which repre-
sentation takes place.
A substantial proportion of the number of complaints and discipli-
nary difficulties seen by disciplinary bodies arise from simple (or
complex) misunderstandings between lawyers and their clients.
Such misunderstandings, of course, stem from a variety of causes,
many of which involve failure of ongoing communications. How-
ever, one must wonder if a clear agreement between the lawyer and
client on such things as fees, tasks to be performed, cooperation
expected from the client, description of costs etc. would not form a
good, solid foundation for effective and appropriate communication
during the relationship.
2. The regular and routine discussing, reading and signing such agree-
ments present a comfortable and natural opportunity for discussing
sensitive matters such as fees and cost.
3. The retention letter allows a specific statement of what a lawyer is
expected to do. In particular, the parties can spell out the types of
activities the lawyer will undertake to meet the purposes and objec-
tives of the representation.
4. The client has a document which can be the beginning of his file
which, hopefully, will be nearly as complete and detailed as the
lawyer's own.
Some, perhaps most, lawyers use very simple agreements, barely more than
a long paragraph. While not being critical, one must at least point out that such
agreements permit very few details concerning the objectives of the representation,
the expectations, the method of fee computation nor for describing various items of
costs or what may be expected under various contingencies. Some lawyers, on the
other hand, use long (5-6 page) agreements which permit very detailed explanations
of what it is the lawyer is to do and what the client may expect. Some of these are
written in an informal manner and are easily readable, while others look very much
like a standard contract and seem to be used for particularly sophisticated clients.
Some plaintiffs lawyers attach the Ohio ATLA (American Trial Lawyers
Assoc.) recommended statement of clients rights5 to their agreement. This is a very
impressive document. One must conclude that, if a client were thoroughly familiar
with it and if the lawyer(s) carried out all its mandates, any opportunities for misun-
derstanding would be significantly reduced.
' See Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, Statement of Your Rights, infra Appendix.
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While it is not the purpose of this paper to critique any individual agreement
or document, it should be noted that retention agreements are, in many ways, no
different than other agreements. It is highly advisable to use consistent terminology
throughout. For example, in contingency fee agreements, the difference between
fees and costs is important since the client remains responsible for costs but not for
fees (unless there is a recovery). Some retention agreements tend to blur that
distinction while seeking to preserve it. One way to blur the distinction is to refer
to costs, expenses, fees, compensations etc. in interchangeable ways without ever
defining them individually. An illustration of the possible confusion of terms is
found in one agreement where, under the heading "Attorney's Fee," it provides "it
is mutually agreed that if nothing is recovered on said claim, the Attorney shall
receive no compensation." It would seem better to use "fee" in both the heading
and the body of the text.
Another source of confusion seems to be the treatment of expert witness costs.
Sometimes, in the same agreement, the subject of expert witnesses is treated
separately and in the general listing of cost items.
NEGOTIATING THE AGREEMENT
There can be no doubt that lawyers and clients may have conflicting interests,
and nowhere is this more possible than in contingency fee arrangements. The
lawyer's investment of time and money in a case is measured, at least subcon-
sciously, against the value of that case. Frequently one hears that a case is simply
"not worth it" to describe lawyer decisions about investments whether of time,
research or money. What a lawyer considers a case to be worth in terms of value or
investment and what a client considers the same case to be worth may be very
different. Nevertheless, clients "negotiate" retention agreements which provide for
large financial, commitments from the client as well as large time and resource
commitments from the lawyer. While it may be subliminally recognized that these
agreements may be between persons with conflicting interests, there is little
indication that these agreements are routinely (or ever) reviewed by other lawyers
in a "second opinion" mode.
We are warned in the Code of Professional Responsibility 6 that a lawyer may
not limit his liability for malpractice. A similar provision exists in the Model Rules
7
6 DR 6-102
A lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his client for his
personal malpractice.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-102 (1981).
7 MR 1.8(h)
A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the laywers liability to a client
for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making
the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client
CLIENT RETENTION AGREEMENTSpring, 19901
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to the effect that a lawyer may not so limit his liability unless there is a separate
negotiation on that limitation in which the client is separately represented. Other
than this, I know of no provision of the disciplinary rules which require a client to
be separately represented in important transactions with his own lawyer.
While my review has been of documents, and I would hesitate to comment on
negotiating these agreements, it is my impression that the contingency fee arrange-
ment normally presented to clients is relatively straight forward and only rarely
modified.
We do know, however, that contingency contracts are negotiable. In fact, fee
arrangements should8 be negotiable since cases, clients and client's needs are so
varied.
In my negotiation class, one of the exercises which I ask the students to
perform is a negotiation for legal representation by a client with a lead-pipe cinch
case. Obviously these students are not experienced in any way but it is remarkable
the different results achieved in these negotiations and, I suspect, could (and perhaps
should) be duplicated in real life with knowledgeable third-party advice to clients in
negotiating contingency fee agreements.
WHO IS THE LAWYER?
Whom Does The Client Retain?
Some retention agreements identify an individual lawyer, some refer to a firm,
some refer to an individual lawyer as the lead lawyer. It seems that this rather clerical
point needs to be thought through. The question of individual lawyer responsibility
for the case, the question of continuation of firm responsibility after a lawyer dies or
leaves the firm and other considerations should be covered. While I don't suggest
that any particular form is improper, I do suggest more careful consideration. For
example, I saw no agreement in which the problem of continuation of representation
was treated. The question of what occurs should the lawyer die, become incapaci-
tated, or leave the firm, is simply not addressed. While these are not common
eventualities, it would seem that both for the client's peace of mind and even more
for internal law firm management, such subjects should be treated. In fact, it would
seem that if the lawyer should die or become incapacitated, the client should have
an opportunity to decide whether to continue the case with someone else in the firm
or9 to remove the matter to a different firm.
without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate
in connection therewith.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.8(h) (1983).
Model Code Of Professional Responsibility EC 2-20 (1981); see this article at pg. 333.
"(f) [Tihe notice makes clear that the client has the right to decide who will complete or continue the
matters." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1457 (1980).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:3
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In some retention agreements, one finds a provision which permits the lawyer
to retain additional counsel. (I assume without further client consultation.) While
this unquestionably simplifies representation in many ways, it appears to be
improper in that the client clearly has the right to determine which lawyers are to be
used. While one may argue that the original retained lawyer remains responsible and
that additional lawyers may not raise the cost of representation, it seems better
practice to provide that the client should be informed and have the opportunity to
object to the retention of particular lawyers. The Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers
"Statement of Your Rights" does provide for such client consent and seems
preferable. I
In one agreement, the letterhead apparently listed lawyers who were not
partners, so there was a disclaimer of any relationship between the retained lawyer
and the other lawyers whose names were carried on the letterhead.
EXPECTATIONS -- TASKS
Agreement concerning the expectations of the parties is critical to the long
range success of the relationship. After a reference to the matter by way of date, time
and event, most retention agreements simply provide that the lawyer will "repre-
sent" the party and ''settle" or try the ''matter."
Only a few of the agreements speak to the kind of tasks that the lawyer may
undertake in fulfilling his overall responsibility of representation. It seems to me that
a paragraph which outlines some of those tasks might be helpful (particularly bearing
in mind that the agreement is a device and an opportunity to discuss the representa-
tion). For example, a paragraph might be inserted to provide that the lawyer will
conduct investigations, do legal research, interview witnesses, negotiate, travel, etc.
Generally, the obligations of the lawyer are not spelled out with any great
specificity. It is provided, for example, that the lawyer will "handle," "negotiate,"
"investigate," perhaps "settle" the client's matter. I saw no commitment to
"diligence," or even "best efforts." Perhaps the Code of Professional Responsi-
bilityI' and the Model Rules,' 2 (the penumbra over these agreements) provide the
10 See Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, Statement of Your Rights, infra Appendix.
1 DR 6-101
(A) lawyer shall not:
Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle,
without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(1) (1981).
I2 Rule 1.1 Competence
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
CLIENT RETENTION AGREEMENTSpring, 1990]
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obligation to competence and diligence. Absent these codes, it is hard to imagine
what the standard might be against which to judge the lawyer's performance under
the vague and non-specific provisions frequently found in retention agreements.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Confidentiality is rarely mentioned in these agreements. Perhaps a reference
to it would highlight the lawyer's obligations to confidentiality as well as the client's
obligation to reveal information, and be candid and cooperative with the lawyer.
COOPERATION
Although one would think it goes without saying, perhaps it would be well to
spell out the fact that the client has an affirmative obligation of cooperation with the
lawyer. In stressing this affirmative obligation of the client, it might be appropriate
to detail what that cooperation might entail. Some agreements did mention the
subject of cooperation, but were not explicit in suggesting that court appearances,
prompt attendance at discovery, supplying documentation, supplying medical
records and information etc. might be required. In addition, the agreements failed
to mention that the client, his whereabouts and all his documents and records should
be available to the lawyer at all times.
RIGHT TO REPRESENT
The "Exclusive Right to prosecute" the claim is sometimes provided,
although, given the client right to terminate which I will review later, it is not clear
what this provision adds.
RIGHT TO SETTLE
Some agreements provide that the client will not settle the case without the
lawyer's consent. Some provide that the matter may not be settled without the
consent of both the client and the lawyer.I3 Both of these provisions would appear
to be questionable. It seems clear that the client has the absolute right to decide if
a matter is to be settled and, if so, for what amount.
EC 7-814 is instructive on this point of the client's right to decide. DR 7-101
the representation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.1 (1983).
'3 Giles v. Russell, 222 Kan. 629, 567 P.2d 845 (1977).
14 EC 7-8
A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after
the client has been informed or relevant considerations.... A lawyer should advise his client
of the possible effect of each legal alternative. A lawyer should bring to bear upon this
[Vol. 23:3
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also provides some guidance in this area. 5 The Model Rules are particularly clear
on this point; Rule 1.2 provides "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether
to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide
by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered,
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify." 16
It seems that a more logical and acceptable provision would be that the client
has the right to determine and decide the acceptability of any settlement and that this
right may be exercised as the client sees fit, perhaps providing for consultation with
the lawyer and continued responsibility for costs and, possibly, a quantum meruit
fee.
COSTS
In providing for costs in the retention agreements, some agreements preface
the matter by reference to the Code of Professional Responsibility (DR 5-103(B))
which requires lawyers to recover costs.' 7 This seems a good idea since it helps to
explain to the client that recovery of costs is grounded in the Code itself and that
lawyers are not permitted to incur them without the obligation to repay. MR 1.8e
18
decision-making process the fullness of his experience as well as his objective viewpoint. In
assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out
those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible.
... In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the decision
whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is
ultimately for the client and not for himself.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981).
'5 DR 7-101
A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1)Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means
permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101 (A)(1) (1981).
16 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
17 DR 5-103(B)
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer
shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client; except that a lawyer may
advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investi-
gation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence,
provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (1981).
IS MR 1.8(e)
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or
contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation; the repayment of which may
CLIENT RETENTION AGREEMENTSpring, 1990]
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also provides for costs and expenses which may be advanced.
It is clear in almost all agreements that costs and expenses, sometimes
generally referred to as "out-of-pocket" expenses are the responsibility of the client
and must be paid by the client. However, retention agreements vary considerably as
to the specificity concerning what items of cost are to be charged to the client.
Naturally, no listing of costs can be all inclusive and such list is usually
preceded by words which indicate that the list is not intended to be inclusive. For
example, such lists frequently begin with "such as." Other limiting expressions to
define costs include "extra-administrative costs such as copying and long distance
telephones," or "duplicating and other unusual" costs. These latter limitations
would seem to raise questions and, perhaps, fuel disputes about fitting costs into
categories demarcated "unusual" or "extra." One agreement called for reimburse-
ment for "document" copying. Are there other kinds of copying?
Again, recognizing the small sample used, there seem to be some specific
items frequently listed, such as: filing fees, court costs, subpoena costs, depositions,
witness fees and expert fees. Some more general provisions might include "inves-
tigation," "out-of-pocket" investigation, "all expenses," and, the somewhat
restrictive, "costs incurred and necessary." Some individual items which would
seem to be included in more general terms but which are sometimes separately
mentioned include photos, hospital record costs, arbitrator costs, courier service,
word processing, witness statements, doctor reports, appraisal and actuarial fees, and
fees for other attorneys.
One item of some interest found in a few of these lists is "computer research"
listed specifically under costs to be reimbursed by the clients. Since computer
research is listed and other research is not, I assume that such "normal" research is
covered by the fee. (One agreement did list "research costs" as an item to be
recovered without modification with "electronic" or "computer.") I would
suggest that computer research is simply a substitute for research of a more normal
or historical variety which is not a cost to be recovered. If the lawyer chooses to do
computer research so as to reduce the time that he or she would otherwise have spent
with more normal research, does it make sense that that charge should be a cost to
the client? While I do not suggest that charging for computer research is in any way
a disciplinary violation, and, if it is to be charged I agree it should be listed, I do
suggest that it does not necessarily fit with the other kinds of costs and perhaps should
be reexamined.
be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation
on behalf of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e) (1983).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:3
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Overtime costs are sometimes charged if they become necessary. Overtime
costs are, apparently, different than straight time costs for secretaries, paralegals, and
the like which are not charged. Obviously, if overtime is to be charged, it should be
listed although it seems difficult to identify the work of one particular client that
caused the overtime need which, presumably, is the justification for such charge.
One agreement provided for a surcharge on all charges and expenses,
although the attorney submitting that item wrote that he had never done so.
With all of these various options, perhaps it makes most sense to find the most
inclusive categorization and then, perhaps, use a few very specific examples clearly
identified as illustrative.
OBLIGATION TO ADVANCE?
Lawyers may advance costs. 9 Must they do so? Does the obligation of
competence2" and diligence2' demand it?
One agreement provides that the client and the lawyer will agree on amounts
to be spent. This is an interesting concept since the client ultimately is responsible
for the costs and probably should be given the opportunity to decide what the level
of cost expenditure should be. On the other hand, the lawyer may feel it necessary
to expend certain sums in order to adequately try the case and the client may disagree
and not be willing to commit those funds or, of course, vice versa.
In short, the client is obligated to pay these costs. The lawyer, at least
impliedly, is obligated to advance them. The question: How much? I saw no
agreement in which the lawyer committed to any specific or even general amount or
19 DR 5-103(B), supra note 17, MR 1.8(e), supra note 18.
20 DR 6-101, supra note 11.
21 DR 7-101(A)
(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means
permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules, except as provided by DR 7-101(B). A
lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by acceding to reasonable
requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice the rights of his client, by being
punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tactics, or by
treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process.
(2) Fail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client for professional
services, but he may withdraw as permitted under DR 2-110, DR 5-102, and DR 5-105.
(3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course of the professional relationship except
as required under DR 7-102(B).
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY DR 7-101 (A) (1981).
CLIENT RETENTION AGREEMENTSpring, 19901
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even to the advancement of "necessary" or "usual" costs (although client's
obligation to pay costs may be described by these adjectives). Therefore, while the
lawyer may advance costs which are spelled out very carefully (and limited) in DR
5-10322, it is not clear what rights a client may have should the lawyer not advance
sufficient monies to adequately handle the matter, or should the lawyer and the client
disagree as to an appropriate level of costs to be expended. Not only is there no
commitment to any specific sum, there is also no limitation.
It is no secret that some cases (especially large, complex, original product
liability or anti-trust claims) require enormous investments 23 of money and it is
probably no secret that lawyers, on occasion, run out of funds and ability to advance
them. Moreover, there could be a legitimate disagreement between the lawyer and
the client arising from the different perceptions of risk and benefit. This different
perception could very well lead to a difference in attitude toward investment or
advance. I saw no agreement that provided for handling this problem.
FEES--IN GENERAL
DR 2-10624 sets forth, in general, the considerations which should be taken
22 DR 5-103(B), supra note 16.
21 Jervey, Grumbling all the Way to the Bank, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1989, at 40. Law firm invests $25-$30
million in anti-trust suit.
24 DR 2-106.
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly
excessive fee.
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence
would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable
fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include
the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employ-
ment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A),(B) (1981).
[Vol. 23:3
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into account in the establishment of fees. Within the overall limitation that fees not
be excessive, the factors which test that determination include time spent, results
achieved, novelty or difficulty of the problem and fees customarily charged.25
The retention agreements I saw provide for either an hourly charge or a
contingent fee. Only one of the agreements seemed to provide for the client to
exercise an option between an hourly charge and a contingent fee. Another
agreement, in an attempt to combine a contingency with an hourly fee provided for
a "suit fee" in addition to the contingency plus a deposit against costs. This
opportunity for the client to select seems to be called for by the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Although a lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on a
contingent fee basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee, it
is not necessarily improper for a lawyer, where justified by the particu-
lar circumstances of a case, to enter into a contingent fee contract in a
civil case with any client who, after being fully informed of all relevant
factors, desires that arrangement.26
Thus, while the client should be given the opportunity to select the payment plan or
method which best fits his or her needs, few, if any, retention agreements provide for
that choice although, of course, such choice may be spelled out by the lawyer in the
2 See also and similarly, Model Rule 1.5(a).
(A) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) *the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved,
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1983).
26 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLrTY Ec 2-20 (1981).
CLIENT RETENTION AGREEMENTSpring, 1990]
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original oral discussion of fees and costs.
DR 2-10627 provides, as mentioned, for a variety of considerations to deter-
mine whether a fee is "excessive" or, as Model Rule 1.5 provides, "reasonable."E"
One could make the argument that a fee established by a single method, whether all
hourly or all contingency would not meet the DR 2-106 or Model Rule 1.5 standard
in that it would not consider all, or even most, of the various factors set forth. Yet,
the single factor fee determinant is the predominant mode. There are, of course,
some exceptions. For example, some contingency fee agreements provide for dif-
ferent percentages depending upon the stage of the proceedings: lowest if there is
a negotiated agreement; more if there is trial, and still more if there is an appeal. It
could be argued that this arrangement provides for a combination of effort, and
perhaps difficulty, as factors which are then expressed as different percentage
amounts.
On the hourly side, there were a couple retention agreements which provided
for hourly charges (different charges for different lawyers or different background
and experience) and then provided that such hourly charges were the minimum or
threshold charges which would be augmented depending upon result. These
provisions would seem to provide for at least a couple of the factors set forth in DR
2-106 and Model Rule 1.5,29 and probably are, should the hourly charge be a
reasonable one, more in conformance with the spirit of DR 2-106. If, on the other
hand, all hourly charges are the same whether or not there is an adjustment for result,
one might question whether such a method meets the spirit of the rules.
One might hypothesize that a contingency agreement should be one in which
there is a real contingency of no recovery. Indeed, one very forceful indictment of
the contingency system30 was that, in may cases, there is no real possibility of no
recovery or stated conversely, that recovery is certain and the only question is the
amount of recovery. In these circumstances, one could argue that proper incentives
for the lawyer and proper consideration for the true contingency situation which
exists would require that the percentage change with the amount recovered. For
example, perhaps no lawyer is necessary to recover, say, the first $50,000. The
lawyer really does his work at some other level, for example, between one and two
million dollars.
While we have seen proposals or regulations in various states to scale
contingencies so that the contingency goes down as the recovery goes up, I suggest
27 DR 2-106, supra note 24.
21 MR 1.5(a), supra note 25.
29 DR 2-106, supra note 24; MR 1.5(a), supra note 25.
30 Grady, Some Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees, 2 LTGATION, Summer 1976, at 20, 23-24;
Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without The Prince of Denmark? 37 U.C.L.A.
LAW REVIEW 29 (1989).
[Vol. 23:3
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that, taking into account the results, one could construct a contingency system in
which the contingency goes up as the amount of recovery goes up. In any event, I
saw no contingency agreement tied to dollar results.
PROPERTY
A couple of contracts provided for the recovery of property as well as money.
The property recovered is valued in some way at market value and the contingency
is applied to that value. Another variation is a provision in one retention agreement
that the recovery or adjustment of the property value in a personal injury case is done
at no charge.
CLOSING CALCULATION - WHAT COMES FIRST?
One of the key items of accounting for final distribution to the client has to do
with the order in which various items are deducted from the gross recovery. The
following example illustrates the differences that may occur in the final amount
which a client may receive. Assume a $100,000.00 recovery, a 33 1/3 percent
contingent fee, and costs of $10,000.00. If costs come out first, and the 33 1/3%
contingency is applied to the remainder the lawyer receives $30,000 and the client
$60,000 as a final, bottom-line number. If on the other hand, the 33 1/3% comes off
the top, the result is different. That scenario results in $57,667 for the client.3' In
short, if the contingent fee comes first, the lawyer receives $3,333 more than if costs
come out first, and, conversely, client receives $3,333 less. Using recovery of
$250,000, same contingency and $50,000 costs, the difference to the client is
31 Costs First Contingency First
$ 100,000-(Recovery) $ 100,000 -(Recovery)
-10.M -(Costs) x .333 -(Contingency)
$ 90,000 -(Net Recovery) $ 33,333 -(Lawyer Fee)
$ 90,000 $100,000
x.333 (Contingency) -33,333
30,000-(Lawyer Fee) $ 66,667
-10,000 Costs)
$ 56,667 to Client
$ 90,000
-30,000
$ 60,000 to Client
Plus For Client - $3,333
CLIENT RETENTION AGREEMENTSpring, 1990]
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approximately $17,000 depending on calculation method.32
Not all contingency fee or other agreements spell out which system will be
utilized. It would appear that this could be a source of some concern or dispute since
the net result is quite different where costs are significant, as they might be in serious,
technical, and protracted products liability cases. In fact, some agreements by reason
of general confusion about such terms as fees, compensation, costs, expenses and the
like are simply confusing. On the other hand, some agreements provide language
which could be read to take the contingency first but which may not be fully
understood unless one is focused on the issue. For example, "our fee will be x
percent of any total amount recovered for all parties before deduction of costs and
expenses," or " x percent of whatever gross amount is recovered."
Some possible questions remain however, such as: What about pre-judgment
interest? What about Rule 11 sanction awards for fees? Are these simply a part of
"total amount recovered"?
One might argue that, since costs are so clearly different from fees and, in
theory at least, are always the responsibility of the client even if there is no recovery,
costs should come out of the total first and the contingency be applied to the balance.
In any event, the matter should be made clear whichever method is to be used. One
method of enhancing clarity is to attach a sample settlement sheet to the agreement
although even this may not really focus the client's attention on this very important
matter.
Please note that DR2- 101 (B)(22) (not applicable in all states) provides that if
one advertises a contingengy fee, one must spell out how and when costs are
deducted.33
3 Costs First Contingency First
$ 250,000-(Recovery) $ 250,000-(Recovery)
-50 000-(Costs) x .333-(Contingency)
$ 200,000 -(Net Recovery) $ 83,333-(Lawyer Fee)
$ 200,000 $ 250,000
x .333 (Contingency) -83.333
66,666 -(Lawyer Fee) $ 166,667
-50,000 (Costs)
$ 116,667 to Client
$200,000
-66,666
$ 133,334 to Client
Plus For Client - $16,667
33 DR 2-101
(B) In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by potential consumers
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FEE CALCULATION: STRUCTURE?
The structured settlement raises interesting problems regarding settlements or
final amounts recovered against which the contingency percentage should be
applied. Today, many (if not most) large settlements are structured and, indeed" the
Ohio Tort Reform Act provides for periodic payments of certain recoveries.'
Some retention agreements provide for present valuation of structured settle-
ments. The most common arrangement, where mentioned at all, is that the
contingency fee will be the agreed upon percentage applied to the current value or
calculated current cost of the structured settlement. This still leaves the question of
how this sum is to be paid, particularly if it is more than the first payment due to the
client. (I understand this is frequently a separate subject in settlement negotiations.)
Some agreements provide an option for the attorney with respect to taking the fee
resulting from the structure, i.e., early payment or payment over the length of the
structure.
Many agreements do not provide for structured settlements. It would appear
sensible to make provision for this increasingly common event. If provision is made
for applying the appropriate percentage to the current value or current cost of the
structure, it might be well also to reference the method by which this valuation will
be reached (an agreed upon actuary or computation system), and further provide (as
in one agreement) that the cost of obtaining this valuation is a cost which will be
included in costs chargeable to the client.
of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast, subject to DR 2-103, the following
information in print media distributed or over television or radio broadcast in the
geographic area or areas in which the lawyer resides or maintains offices or in which a
significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides, provided that the information disclosed
by the lawyer in such publication or broadcast complies with DR 2-101(A), and is
presented in a dignified manner:
(22) Contingent fee rates subject to DR 2-106(C), provided that the statement discloses
whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs;
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry DR 2-101(B)(22) (1981). Similar provision in Ohio State Bar
proposed revisions to DR 2-101.
ORC § 2323.56
After the hearing described in division (D)(1) of this section and prior to the entry ofjudgment
in accordance with Civil Rule 58, the court shall determine, in its discretion, whether all or
any part of the total of the portions of the future damages described in division (B)(l)b)(i),(iv),
and (v) of this section shall be received by the plaintiff in question in a series of periodic
payments rather than in a lump sum. If the court determines that a series of periodic payments
shall be received by that plaintiff, it may order such payments only as to the amount of that
total that exceeds both two hundred thousand dollars and twenty-five per cent of the total of
the damages described in divisions (B)(1)(a) and (b) of this section.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 2323.56(D)(3) (Baldwin Supp. 1988). For a discussion on how lawyers' contingent
fees are paid in structual settlement situations, see Dubin, PayMeNow, orPay Me For Years, NAT. L. JOURNAL
April 9, 1990 p. 13 .
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POST TRIAL COMPENSATION
An important consideration in retention agreements is providing for what will
happen should there be post-trial action or activity. In short, what happens in case
of an appeal?
Since "appeal" is not defined in the agreements (except in one agreement that
provides for an extra percentage after an appeal is "filed"), it is not entirely clear
how one might separate this concept into the various possible activities under a
general heading of "appeal" and devise solutions to all situations that might arise.
For example, there might be a more or less routine filing of an appeal with the
intention that some type of settlement will be worked out. In this instance, although
there may technically be an "appeal," there is not much, if any, additional work on
the lawyer's part and yet, according to some agreements, there is an additional
percentage or a new agreement for additional compensation.
There are instances where there is an appeal by a defendant and, one can argue,
there is no recovery at all until the appeal is resolved. Conversely, there may be
instances in which the plaintiff wishes to appeal or the lawyer for the plaintiff wishes
to appeal. It would seem to me that each of these scenarios would produce a different
result as to an equitable arrangement of fees beyond the agreed upon point of a jury
verdict.
Some agreements which provide for varying fee percentages depending upon
the time that the final settlement is made provide for the highest percentage to be
applied should an appeal be necessary before final payment. (Some agreements do
not provide for appeal and simply set out one percentage to be applied to the final
payment.) Interestingly, however, several agreements provide separately for the
appeal process. These agreements provide for a "new and separate" agreement for
any post-trial activity, presumably for more fees. While these agreements simply
state that there will be a new agreement on appeal, the terms of that agreement are
not spelled out and it is not clear if the client is, in some way, obligated to reach such
an agreement and, if so, on what terms. It is also not clear whether such an agreement
will be for a fixed fee or for an additional percentage fee. One such agreement
specifically provided that the agreement for post-trial activity would provide for
"additional" payment to the lawyer.
Does it matter who appeals? Does it matter that the appeal activity is necessary
because the other party filed the appeal? One might ask what would occur in such
a case were there to be an agreement for an additional, fixed sum on appeal and the
appeal was lost. Would this mean that the client would then not have to pay the
percentage contingency since no recovery was had but that the client would be
obligated to pay the fixed fee for the appeal?
[Vol. 23:3
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While there may be no specific ethical or professional responsibility consid-
erations here, it would seem appropriate to spell out the matter of an appeal
somewhat more clearly. The use of different percentages for various stages of effort
might be an appropriate solution.
Frankly, the provision for an additional (undefined) contract for the appeal
process is one which seems fraught with peril as it is impossible to understand exactly
what the client's obligations are or, indeed, the lawyers'. To pose a ridiculous
example, what if the lawyer, faced with an appeal to save ajudgment for $25,000.00,
insists on $20,000.00 to prosecute the appeal? Surely the client's original agreement
to enter into a separate and new contract would not compel the client to agree to any
such amount. If no agreement is reached, what then?
If provision is made for another agreement, it seems to require much more
detail, maybe even a sample agreement for appeal. Most agreements simply ignore
this matter. Presumably this means the lawyer is obligated to do whatever is neces-
sary to secure or protect recovery.
DIVISION OF FEES
DR 2-107 provides for the rules under which fees may be divided between or
among lawyers. Essentially, such division can only be made with client consent 5 in
proportion to the services performed and the responsibilities assumed by each.36 Not
surprisingly, there are now several states which have addressed this particular
question and made modifications in the strictures of this rule. 37 In essence, what
seems to be occurring is a recognition of the value of the referral itself or some further
recognition that, so long as the total fee is not larger than it would otherwise have
35 DR 2-107(A)(1)
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not a partner
in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a
division of fees will be made.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY DR 2-107(A)(1)(1981).
DR 2-107(A)(2)
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not a partner
in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and responsibility
assumed by each.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A)(2)(1981).
3 California, Texas, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Michigan allow lawyers to accept a
referral fee without assuming responsibility or providing services for the client. Marcotte, Mich. NowAllows
Referral Fees, A.B.A. J., May, 1989, at 32. See Proposed Amendments to the Code of Professional
Responsibility, OHIO OFFICIAL REPORTS (Advance Sheet), May 7, 1990 at A-1.
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been, and so long as the client accepts the arrangement, there is no problem with
division of fees.
Nonetheless, so long as DR 2-107 is included in a state's rules, it will continue
to challenge that division of fees which, in many instances, is routine regardless of
service or responsibility.
This particular problem is rarely addressed in retention agreements I saw,
except for one agreement which provided for client consent to a co-counsel
arrangement and a "division" (unspecified) of fees. Interestingly, the statement of
rights adopted by Ohio ATLA provides specifically for this eventuality in paragraph
number 4:
Before signing a fee contract with you, a lawyer must advise you
whether he or she intends to handle your case alone or whether other
lawyers will be helping with the case. If your lawyer intends to refer the
case to other lawyers he or she should tell you what kind of fee sharing
arrangement will be made with the other lawyers. If lawyers from
different law firms will represent you, at least one lawyer from each law
firm must sign the fee contract.38
Further, section 5 of the same document provides:
If your lawyer intends to refer a case to another lawyer or counsel with
other lawyers, your lawyer should tell you about that at the beginning.
If your lawyer takes the case and later decides to refer it to another
lawyer or to associate with other lawyers, you should sign a new
contract which includes the new lawyers. You, the client, also have the
right to consult with each lawyer working on your case and each lawyer
is legally responsible for the acts of the other lawyers involved in the
case.
39
Some agreements provide that the principle lawyer retained by the client shall
have the right to associate or employ additional counsel at the expense of the attorney
and designating the additional counsel to appear on behalf of the client. Still others
provide for the right of the principle attorney to retain other lawyers.
It would seem preferable in these agreements to inform the client concerning
additional lawyers to be retained, giving the client the opportunity to consent to such
arrangements and providing that the total fee will not exceed the fee set forth in the
agreement.
31 Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, Statement of Your Rights, infra Appendix; Waterman v. Kitrick, No.
89AP-675 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1990) (WESTLAW, 1990 wl 10982).
39 Id.
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CLOSING
Some agreements provide for closing statements and, of course, closing
statements are now mandated in Ohio in personal injury litigation.40 Some retention
agreements include proposed or sample closing forms which would appear to be
helpful and which serve to highlight the question of whether costs come out of the
gross amount or out of the net amount after contingency.
WITHDRAWAL
The mater of lawyer withdrawal is treated in some, but by no means all,
agreements. There are, of course, many justifications for mandatory or permissive
withdrawal included in DR 2-110. Any withdrawal must be subject to the require-
ment that the interests of the client be protected and in some instances tribunal
approval received.4'
4 ORC § 4705.15(C)
If an attorney represents a client in connection with a claim as described in division
(B) of this section, if their contract for the provision of legal services includes a contingency
fee agreement, and if the attorney becomes entitled to compensation under that agreement,
the attorney shall prepare a signed closing statement and shall provide the client with that
statement at the time of or prior to the receipt of compensation under that agreement. The
closing statement shall specify the manner in which the compensation of the attorney was
determined under that agreement, any costs and expenses deducted by the attorney from the
judgment or settlement involved, any proposed division of the attorney's fees, costs, and
expenses with referring or associated counsel, and any other information that the attorney
considers appropriate.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 4705.15(C) (Baldwin 1988). One agreement states that it conforms to ORC
§ 4705.15(C).
41 DR 2-110 Withdrawal from Employment.
(A) In general.
(1) If permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the rules of a tribunal, a
lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in a proceeding before that tribunal
without its permission.
(2) In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken
reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including
giving due notice to his client, allowing time for employment of other counsel,
delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and
complying with applicable laws and rules.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLIny DR 2-1 10(A)(1),(2) (1981).
DR 2-110
(B) Mandatory Withdrawal.
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission if required by its
rules, shall withdraw from employment, and a lawyer representing a client in other
Spring, 1990]
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Several retention agreements provide specifically that the lawyer may with-
draw if the lawyer concludes that further prosecution of the case or matter is not
feasible or, I suppose, promises to be non-productive. (In whose opinion - the lawyer
matters shall withdraw from employment, if:
(1) He knows or it is obvious that his client is bringing the legal action, conducting the
defense, or asserting a position in the litigation, or as otherwise having steps taken
from him, merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person.
(2) He knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of
a Disciplinary Rule.
(3) His mental or physical condition renders it unreasonably difficult for him to carry out
the employment effectively.
(C) Permissive withdrawal
If DR 2-110(B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request permission to withdraw in
matters pending before a tribunal, and may not withdraw in other matters, unless
such request or such withdrawal is because:
(1) His client:
(a) Insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted under existing law
and cannot be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law.
(b) Personally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct.
(c) Insists that the lawyer pursue a course ofconduct that is illegal or that is prohibited
under the Disciplinary Rules.
(d) By other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out his
employment effectively.
(e) Insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer engage in
conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not
prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules.
(f) Deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses
or fees.
(2) His continued employment is likely to result in a violation of a Disciplinary Rule.
(3) His inability to work with co-counsel indicates that the best interests of the client
likely will be served by withdrawal.
(4) His mental or physical condition renders it difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively.
(5) His client knowingly and freely assents to termination of his employment.
(6) He believes in good faith, in a proceeding pending before a tribunal, that the tribunal
will find the existence of other good cause for withdrawal.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY DR 2-1 10(B)(C) (1981).
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or the client?)
In particular, questions about withdrawal in the retainer agreements seem to
revolve around what will happen if the client rejects the settlement advice of counsel.
Provisions for such rejection include:
1. If the client rejects a settlement offer, the client is obligated to pay all
costs to date whereas previously he was not expected to do so until
the case was concluded.
2. After a client has rejected a settlement that is recommended by
counsel the client becomes obligated to the lawyer for the fees and
costs otherwise outlined in the agreement.
If my reading of these provisions is correct, this would mean that the client upon
rejection of a settlement offer, becomes instantly liable for the percentage fee
provided for in the agreement applied to the rejected settlement number. In addition,
some agreements provide for what occurs when the client simply discharges the
lawyer. Here again, there are attempts to provide that the client becomes responsible
for the percentage fee provided in the agreement itself. These provisions are very
questionable.
It seems clear that the relationship between the lawyer and the client is one
which the client may terminate at any time. 2 It would appear that the law of the
United States, in general, is that the attorney, therefore, has no cause of action for
breach of contract for the discharge. Nonetheless, the lawyer may have a claim for
the value of services rendered43 In so far as the client's obligation to pay a
contingency fee at the time that an offer is made and rejected, the answer seems to
42 See Fracasse v. Brent, 6Cal. 3d 784,790,494 P.2d 9, 13, 10Cal. Rptr. 385,388-89 (1972). See also Ohio
ATLA standard form:
2. You have a right to have your contract in writing. You have 3 business days to reconsider
the contract. You may cancel the contract without any reason if you notify your lawyer in
writing within 3 business days of signing the contract. If you withdraw from the contract
within the first 3 days you do not owe the lawyer a fee although you may be responsible for
the lawyer's actual costs during that time. But if your lawyer begins to represent you, your
lawyer may not withdraw from the case without giving you notice, delivering necessary
papers to you, and allowing you time to employ another lawyer. Often, your lawyer must
obtain court approval before withdrawing from a case. If you discharge your lawyer without
good cause after the 3-day period, you may have to pay a fee for work the lawyer has done.
Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, Statement of Your Rights, par.. 2, infra Appendix.
See also Annotation, Limitation to Quantum Meruit Recovery, Where Attorney Employed under Contingent
Fee Contract is Discharged without Cause, 92 A.L.R. 3rd 690 (1979).
43 Fox & Assoc. Co., L.P.A. v. Purdon, 44 Ohio St. 3d 69,541 N.E.2d 448 (1989).
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be that the client is not so obligated." In other words, the client has the right to reject
settlement offers.45 If the client rejects such offer, it would not appear that there is
an immediate obligation to the lawyer since the client had the right to reject. The
lawyer, on the other hand, may have the right, if he wishes to exercise it, of
withdrawing from the case (DR 2-110) and suing on a quantum meruit theory.
The general rule in the United States appears to be that, after a lawyers
withdrawal from a case, whether for cause or not, the lawyer has a right to be paid
on a quantum meruit basis. This means that the lawyer is entitled to recover the fair
value of the services rendered.' For example, in Ohio, it is now clear as a result of
the Fox case decided in July 1989 that the Supreme Court now embraces the same
right to a quantum meruit recovery although the manner of calculation is not clear.
(Calculation was for the lower court after remand).
To summarize:
1. It seems appropriate to try to cover the question of fees in circum-
stances in which the relationship between the lawyer and the client
is disrupted or ended. However, it would appear that attempts to do
this by requiring immediate payment of the contingent fee are over-
reaching and improper.
2. A client may discharge a lawyer. It is part of the lawyer-client rela-
tionship. There seems to be no cause of action for breach of contract.
3. Nevertheless, lawyers are entitled to be paid for what they have done
at the time the relationship is severed. The payment is on a quantum
merit basis and is designed to pay the lawyer the value of his or her
services. There are a number of factors which are considered by the
courts in establishing this amount, i.e., "The nature of the litigation,
its difficulty, the skill required, the skill employed, the attention
given, the success or failure, the attorney's efforts, the attorney's
skill and learning, including his age and experience in the particular
type of work demanded." 47
4. It seems clear that the obligation of the client to pay is not an
obligation which arises immediately upon the discharge of the
" See Michael D. Tulley Co., L.P.A. v. Dollney, 42 Ohio App. 3d 138, 140, 537 N.E.2d 242, 245 (1987);
Bernard v. Moretti, 34 Ohio App. 3d 317,518 N.E.2d 599 (1987); Fox, 44 Ohio St. 3d 69, 541 N.E.2d 448.
But see Hagans, Brown & Gibbs v. First National Bank ofAnchorage, 783 P.2D 1164 (Alaska 1989)(Client
who refuses toaccept settlement in order to renegotiate attorney's fees may have breached duty of good faith
and fiar dealing).
45 EC 7-8, supra note 13; MR 1.2, supra note 16.
4 See Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d at 792, 494 P.2d at 14-15; Fox & Assoc. Co., L.P.A. v. Purdon, 44 Ohio
St. 3d 69, 541 N.E.2d 448; Annotation, supra note 42.
4 City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles - INYO Farms, 134 Cal. App. 268,276,25 P.2d 224,227-28 (1933).
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lawyer when the contract itself provided for a contingency fee based
upon recovery. The lawyer may not automatically recover a contin-
gency based upon the last offer when no recovery has been realized.
5. In any event, an attempt to cover this question should probably be
limited to an attempt to set forth some standards for the application
of the quantum meruit doctrine, i.e., setting forth an hourly fee rate.
CONFLICT
The area of conflict is one which has become more and more important
although the more typical personal injury retention and fee agreement is not likely
to result in conflict. However, entering into an agreement to represent a company
on a broad or even a narrow basis can give rise to serious conflict questions in the
future. Retention agreements represent a good opportunity at the earliest time to
address the possible conflict question.
First, the agreement should spell out in detail exactly what the matter is that
is being handled. This serves to limit the overall representation and to highlight the
limits of the representation.
Second, the retention agreement might call attention to the fact that the Firm
represents other parties and spell out exactly what the Firms' intentions are with
respect to potential conflict. For example, the letter might indicate that the Firm
agrees not to represent anyone else in the same matter or in matters which might call
upon the use of any confidential information secured in the course of the subject
representation. Otherwise, the firm is free to take on new clients.
Third, it might be important for the firm to set forth some of the other clients
it represents or other areas in which it practices so as to signal possible conflicts
which might call into question the continued representation of the client.
Fourth, the representation agreement might provide for how the client wants
conflicts of this type resolved. The agreement might provide an appropriate source
in the client organization to help resolve the conflict or, perhaps, waive any conflict
rights.
DISPUTES
Two agreements provided for action in case of dispute about the agreement or
the fees that are to be charged, providing that matters of dispute would be referred
to the appropriate dispute resolution systems of the Bar Association for ultimate
resolution.
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Although a lawyer may not limit his own liability for malpractice,48 I see no
reason why he may not provide some options for resolving disputes which may arise.
In fact, it seems that such provision would enhance client satisfaction and perhaps
resolve matters before a client perceived the need to file a complaint.49 One
agreement provided that the agreement should be considered a "work product" and
be construed in accordance with Ohio law.
DISCLAIMER
Although one would suppose it might go without saying, there were a couple
agreements which specifically stated that the attorneys made no promises or
guarantees of any outcome.
CONCLUSION
The retention agreement is a key document in the lawyer-client relationship
and affords a unique opportunity for Lawyer and client to discuss the elements, ex-
pectations and costs of the relationship which is to follow. It is a special opportunity
to consider and delineate the expectations on both sides, the cooperation and respon-
siveness needed from the client and the communication, dedication and concern
expected from the lawyer. It sets the tone for the ease or difficulty of that relationship
as time goes on.
Some agreements take advantage of this opportunity. Most do not. Most are
surprisingly sparse and many would not be readily understood if one is not alert to
the kinds of questions that the sometimes elliptical language is designed to address
or, perhaps, to obfuscate. Worse, many of the agreements seem to be overreaching
in the area of lawyer withdrawal after some settlement offer is made, most do not
seem to reflect the prevailing law on the subject of the client right to terminate, and
many leave the accounting to be made at the termination of the relationship difficult
to monitor.
I believe that lawyers should take a new look at this contract in the same critical
light with which they would view a proposal for a large contractual agreement
presented to a client in an arms length setting.
48 DR 6-102, supra note 7.
9 See also Reich, Ease ofArbitration, A.B.A.J., Aug. 1989, at 100; Anderson v. Elliott, 555 A.2d 1042 (Me.
1989) (upholding mandatory fee arbitration).
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APPENDIX
STATEMENT OF YOUR RIGHTS
The Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers wants you to be aware of your rights
regarding the proposed contingency fee agreement. The Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers wants you to make an intelligent and informed decision concerning your
contract. This statement is not a part of the actual contract between you and your
lawyer, but as a potential client, you should understand your rights:
1. You, the client, have the right to talk to your lawyer about the fee
to be paid. There is no legal requirement that a lawyer charge a
client an hourly rate, a set fee, or a percentage of money received.
You have the right to discuss the hourly rate, set fee or percentage
as in any other contract. If you do not reach an agreement with one
lawyer you may talk with other lawyers.
2. You have a right to have your contract in writing. You have 3
business days to reconsider the contract. You may cancel the
contract without any reason if you notify your lawyer in writing
within 3 business days of signing the contract. If you withdraw from
the contract within the first 3 days you do not owe the lawyer a fee
although you may be responsible for the lawyer's actual costs
during that time. But if your lawyer begins to represent you, your
lawyer may not withdraw from the case without giving you notice,
delivering necessary papers to you, and allowing you time to
employ another lawyer. Often, your lawyer must obtain court
approval before withdrawing from a case. If you discharge your
lawyer without good cause after the 3-day period, you may have to
pay a fee for work the lawyer has done.
3. Before hiring a lawyer, you, the client, have the right to know about
the lawyer's education, training and experience. If you ask, the
lawyer should tell you specifically about his or her actual experi-
ence dealing with cases similar to yours. If you ask, the lawyer
should provide information about special training or knowledge
and give you this information in writing if you request it.
4. Before signing a fee contract with you, a lawyer must advise you
whether he or she intends to handle your case alone or whether other
lawyers will be helping with the case. If your lawyer intends to refer
the cases to other lawyers he or she should tell you what kind of fee
sharing arrangement will be made with the other lawyers. If
lawyers from different law firms will represent you, at least one
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lawyer from each law firm must sign the fee contract.
5. If your lawyer intends to refer a case to another lawyer or counsel
with other lawyers, your lawyer should tell you about that at the
beginning. If your lawyer takes the case and later decides to refer
it to another lawyer or to associate with other lawyers, you should
sign a new contract which includes the new lawyers. You, the
client, also have the right to consult with each lawyer working on
your case and each lawyer is legally responsible for the acts of the
other lawyers involved in the case.
6. You the client, have the right to know in advance how you will need
to pay the expenses and the legal fees at the end of the case. If you
pay a deposit in advance for costs, you may ask reasonable ques-
tions about how the money will be or has been spent and how much
of it remains unspent. Your lawyer should give a reasonable
estimate about future necessary costs. If your lawyer agrees to
advance money to prepare or research the case, you have the right
to know periodically how much money your lawyer has spent on
your behalf. You also have the right to decide, after consulting with
your lawyer, how much money is to be spent to prepare a case. If
you pay the expenses, you have the right to decide how much to
spend. Your lawyer should also inform you whether the fee will be
based on the gross amount recovered or on the amount recovered
minus the costs.
7. You, the client, have the right to be told by your lawyer about
possible adverse consequences if you lose the case. Those adverse
consequences might include money which you might have to pay to
your lawyer for costs, and liability you might have for attorney's
fees to the other side.
8. You, the client, have the right to receive and approve a closing
statement at the end of the case before you pay any money. The
statement must list all of the financial details of the entire case in-
cluding the amount recovered, all expenses, and a precise statement
of your lawyer's fee. Until you approve the closing statement you
need not pay any money to anyone, including your lawyer. You also
have the right to have every law firm working on your case sign this
closing statement.
9. You, the client, have the right to ask your lawyer at reasonable
intervals how the case is progressing and to have these questions
answered to the best of your lawyer's ability.
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10. You, the client, have the right to make the final decision regarding
settlement of a case. Your lawyer must notify you of all offers of
settlement before and after the trial. Offers during the trial must be
immediately communicated and you should consult with your law-
yer regarding whether to accept a settlement. However, you must
make the final decision to accept or reject a settlement.
11. If at any time, you, the client, believe that your lawyer has charged
an excessive fee, you, the client, have the right to report the matter
to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Ohio State Bar Association, or the
Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. You may reach a representative
of the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers by telephoning (614) 488-
3151. Any disagreement between you and your lawyer about a fee
can be taken to court and you may wish to hire another lawyer to
help you resolve this disagreement.
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